Autor: Julián Manzano Gómez

Ludwig Maximiliams University of Munich

Modalidad: Online

Abstract:
In contemporary politics, there has been a noticeable trend towards the judicialisation of politics, wherein courts increasingly address significant political issues (Ferejohn, 2002; Hirschl, 2008). This led to concerns about the politicisation of courts, marked by the introduction of political or partisan dynamics into judicial decision-making processes (Hirschl, 2009). In the European Union, this has been even more important due to the Rule of Law crisis in countries such as Poland or Hungary and the importance of judicial governance of many member states.
While the implications of judicialisation have been extensively studied in relation to courts and their rulings, less attention has been paid to other institutions within the judiciary, such as judicial councils. Judicial councils are independent bodies tasked with the governance of the judiciary. Their primary objective is to shield the judiciary from party politics, protecting its formal independence. However, empirical evidence suggests a disparity between these theoretical objectives and the practical realities observed. A significant body of literature, largely focused on case studies of individual countries, indicates that judicial councils often fall short in safeguarding judicial independence, instead becoming prone to corporatism and politicisation (Haley, 2006; Bobek and Kosar, 2013a; Castillo-Ortiz, 2017; Šipulová et al., 2023; Kosar, Sipulova, and Kadlec, 2024).
This research project seeks to address a critical gap in the existing literature by investigating the conditions under which judicial councils become politicised. Specifically, the study aims to identify whether certain institutional designs within judicial councils render them more susceptible to political control. Previous studies on the politicisation of judicial councils have predominantly concentrated on the political appointment of council members. It is also often assumed that the stronger a judicial council is, the more attractive it becomes for political control. However, this project challenges these assumptions by asking a more nuanced question: Is there a specific institutional design or specific competences within judicial councils that makes them particularly attractive for partisan control? To explore this question, the study will map out the various institutional designs found within the European Union member states. By comparing these designs, this research will theorise specific competences of judicial councils that makes them most susceptible to political capture. I will argue that while political appointment of council members may facilitate capture, it is ultimately the control over judicial careers that plays a decisive role in their politicisation.
The relevance of this study is situated within the broader debate on the political governance of the EU, particularly in light of the challenges faced by judiciaries in countries ranging from Hungary to Spain. It will also address wider concerns on judicial independence, accountability and representation, areas that have received insufficient attention from political science. Consequently, this project will not only contribute to a deeper understanding of the dynamics of politicisation within the judiciary but also to the debates on judicial governance and European institutional governance overall, with the aim to strengthen institutions safeguards for judicial independence in EU Member States.